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Using structuration theory, in line with Anthony Giddens (1984), and assuming 
that every government has a stake in guiding, steering and controlling public 
communication, this paper explores the major principles that can be used to ex-
plain different mass media structures around the globe. Who or what does actually 
influence journalists’ working conditions, their autonomy, and the quality of the 
media content in certain societies?  
This paper argues in favor of maintaining the nation-state as the analytical unit in 
mass media systems research, even in the age of the Internet and globalization 
(Pfetsch and Esser, 2008) and despite both technological convergence and the in-
creasing importance of transnational television and radio offerings (Flew and 
Waisbord, 2015). The key argument is based on states’ natural interest in guiding, 
steering and controlling the public information and opinion-forming stages. In big 
countries, such as India, this may be equally applicable to subnational units 
(Chakravartty and Roy, 2013). How the people in charge can serve this interest, 
however, differs from world region to world region. Looking beyond the “tiny 
handful of countries” upon which evidence in communication research is usually 
based (Curran and Park, 2000, p. 3) and comparing 46 national mass media sys-
tems around the globe, the present paper has two main aims.  
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The first is to sharpen the perception of how ruling powers exercise a controlling 
influence over mass media content. Second, in doing so, the paper calls for ap-
proaches that leave the close link to political systems research behind, and it seeks 
to examine societal structures in a more general way. The study’s main result is 
that media freedom and journalists’ autonomy depend on not only the particular 
governmental system, the constitution, journalism education, and the existence of 
commercial media but also, to a significant extent, on economic realities, the tradi-
tion of press freedom, and various other factors that are historical, religious, 
and/or geographic. This list of influences shows that I conceptualize mass media 
structures not as cause (of certain content, for example) but as effect (of certain 
societal structures), and this differs from the usual research approaches. The re-
sulting typology (as presented in the results section) is a tool that can be used to 
explain the differences in the media’s performance around the globe (conclusion). 
 
Comparative research on mass media systems and journalism cultures is currently 
popular (e.g., Thomaß, 2013). The landmark book Comparing Media Systems 
(Hallin and Mancini, 2004) triggered a flood of follow-up studies and publications 
that underpinned or extended the original typology (e.g., Brüggemann et al., 
2014), transferred it beyond the Western world (e.g., Hallin and Mancini, 2012), or 
criticized it fundamentally (e.g., Norris, 2009; Hardy, 2012). Furthermore, there 
are competing approaches, such as that of the Worlds of Journalism research 
group, which focuses on journalism cultures (e.g., Hanusch and Hanitzsch, 2017); 
Kathrin Voltmer (2013), whose work focuses on transitional democracies and path 
dependencies; Robert McKenzie (2006), who studied media regulation and financ-
ing in eight very heterogeneous countries; and Roger Blum’s typology, which co-
vers 23 countries from all over the world (Blum, 2014). All of these researchers 
carry on a tradition that was started by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956) and 
extended, as well as criticized, by Nixon (1960), Merrill and Lowenstein (1979), 
Hachten and Hachten (1981), McQuail (1983), Wiio (1983), Altschull (1984), Pi-
card (1985), Breunig (1994), Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), Nerone (1995), and 
Yin (2008), to name some of the more prominent authors. Altogether, these stud-
ies have radically expanded our knowledge of mass media systems. The very same 
is true for the media freedom rankings by interest-based organizations, which play 
a crucial role in policy consultations and attract considerable public interest, at 
least in the developed West (e.g., Freedom House, Reporters without Borders, and 
IREX). 
 
The academic and applied lines of research have a number of commonalities. Both 
lines originated in the United States and, therefore, in a highly liberalized and 
mainly self-regulated media environment. Moreover, they share a strong focus on 
the media’s role in facilitating democratic decision-making and, closely linked to 
this, on state restrictions on the freedom of expression. Although there are excep-
tions—for example, the fact that the political economy highlights constraints that 
are rooted in ownership structures and the media’s dependency on advertising 
(e.g., Wasko, Murdock, and Sousa, 2011) or the “positive concept of freedom” that 
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promotes the idea that the state should actively create a framework for journalists 
(Sapiezynska and Lagos, 2016, p. 550)—the starting point of both research lines 
tends to be the relationship between mass media, politics, and media bureaucracy. 
Consequently, most research is on state control, restraints and obstacles, media 
partisanship, political parallelism, media law, politically motivated attacks on 
journalists, and the ideological foundations of the respective mass media systems. 
This approach underestimates culture, audiences, and economical influences, and 
devaluates non-Western countries, which are at the bottom of the dominant media 
freedom indexes (Becker, Vlad, and Nusser, 2007; Sapiezynska and Lagos, 2016). 
Part of the game is the Western perspective on concepts that can be understood in 
different ways (Altschull, 1984; Rantanen, 2013). 
 
In addition, in regard to the popular media freedom rankings, as well as the mod-
els, theories, and ideal media system types developed at universities, most avai-
lable classifications aim to explain the differences in media content, role percep-
tions, and media usage. In other words, in keeping with communication studies’ 
disciplinary logic, national media structures are seen as just another crucial com-
ponent of the complex chain of media effects. In comparative research, knowledge 
of mass media systems, therefore, results in sampling strategies, which include as 
many different models as possible (e.g., Ostini and Fung, 2002; Benson, 2010). 
This, in turn, leads to two consequences. On the one hand, mass media systems 
research neglects the reasons for the differences in media structures around the 
globe. In line with the classic Four Theories of the Press (Siebert, Peterson, and 
Schramm, 1956), the respective typologies use either the underlying objective of 
the media as the criterion for the differentiation of mass media systems, or they 
rely on the categories, factors, and indicators listed in the literature on mass media 
systems. In one extreme case, Blum (2014) includes 11 dimensions that run the 
gamut from history, as well as political and journalism cultures, to media owner-
ship, financing, and freedom. On the other hand, this example shows that the cri-
teria are often not selective, nor do they clearly separate cause from effect. A more 
prominent example is Hallin and Mancini (2004), who use political and media di-
mensions exclusively (media market structures, political parallelism, the profes-
sionalization of journalism, and the role of the state). Their typology, which is 
based on all four dimensions, shows only how politics and mass media fit together, 
and it allows to bring order into the diversity of countries. The function of 
knowledge organization also applies to attempts at measuring, quantifying, and, 
ultimately, classifying mass media systems (Brüggemann et al., 2014).  
 
The present paper takes a step back to examine the rules governing mass media 
structures. The way to the target is, once again, a mass media systems typology. 
Despite being grounded in qualitative methodology, this typology works similarly 
to cluster analysis. More specifically, solely two empirical criteria are the basis of 
the categorization. To determine influences on mass media structures, like the 
computer programs used to conduct quantitative data analysis, I did look for addi-
tional variables that are shared by countries of a certain type. To generate general 
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insights into the interaction between agency and structure, this study integrates 
the known mass media system dimensions into social theory. As the first step, us-
ing structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), the present paper develops a set of cate-
gories that can guide mass media system analysis. In step two, it applies this sys-
tem of categories to the 46 countries that were selected using the theoretical satu-
ration method (Glaser and Strauss, 2008). The material on which the study is 
based was collected and analyzed using the triangulation method. This paper 
draws primarily on extensive documentary analysis (constitutions, media laws, 
media regulations, press freedom indices, academic reports, and historical ac-
counts). In addition, to fill the gaps left by the available documents and to gain al-
ternative perspectives, it includes data from more than 150 expert interviews. 
 
 
Research Categories 
 
Like any other social theory, Giddens’ structuration approach provides terms that 
describe reality. According to Giddens, these terms help to transfer knowledge 
from practical to discursive consciousness. Like any other social theory, Giddens 
provides a certain perspective on society that includes cause–effect relationships 
(Kort and Gharbi, 2013). First, structuration theory places emphasis on agents. 
Simply put, Giddens believes in agents’ capacities to change structures. Particular-
ly in mass media systems research, structures, such as media laws, licensing au-
thorities, media ministries, or social taboos, are usually seen as restrictive. In con-
trast, Giddens asserts that the structures and the agents cannot be separated but 
are deeply intertwined in what he calls the “duality of structure.” Based on his ap-
proach, “structures” (or “social structures”) are “recursively organized sets of rules 
and resources” (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). Rules restrict social actions, while resources 
facilitate them; thus, structures are both constraining and enabling. To use the 
above examples, without media laws and authorities, there would be no journal-
ism. Part of the duality of the concept of structure is that agents, such as journal-
ists, media owners, politicians, journalism educators, and media activists, have an 
impact on rules and resources by reproducing or modifying them. Therefore, ac-
cording to Giddens, agents are even able to change national mass media systems. 
  
Applying this approach to mass media systems, transforming its basic assumptions 
into a visual format, and, in this way, displaying the present study’s research cate-
gories, Figure 1 is a type of summary. At the edges of the figure are the social and 
natural contexts of national mass media systems. In structuration theory, social 
systems refer to the reproduced practices of agents, who are physically or mentally 
co-present, which is another reason why structuration theory is appropriate for 
mass media systems research. Thus, social systems are “grounded in the knowl-
edgeable activities of situated actors who draw upon rules and resources” in differ-
ent action contexts (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). Parts of the mass media system’s natu-
ral context are geography, topography, and infrastructural features. The social con-
text includes religions, values and norms, civil society, education, and economy, to 
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name the most prominent dimensions. In keeping with the literature referred to so 
far, Figure 1 gives priority to the political system, which obviously has an impact on 
mass media. However, the judicial, economic, cultural, and other systems are not 
absent but are represented by the empty field in the bottom right corner. 
 
Figure 1: Research Categories 
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Further inside the figure—apart from the co-present foreign agents, such as 
transnational broadcasters, Internet sites, and NGOs or donors offering, for 
example, training for journalists—individual, collective, and corporative agents, 
such as media owners, media producers, and media unions are displayed. It is 
crucial to note here that, first, these agents know about the others, which is why 
they observe each other and adjust their behavior accordingly. Second, all agents 
have certain role perceptions, which are anchored in their practical and discursive 
consciousness. Because practical consciousness includes implicit knowledge about 
agents’ behavior in certain social situations, people are unable to express all role 
perceptions and rules discursively.  
 
However, all agents are aware of the written and unwritten social rules and 
routinely apply them in the production and reproduction of their day-to-day 
encounters. Using Giddens’ terminology, rules are frameworks or guidelines for 
how media professionals should act. Examples are the national constitution and 
media laws (both of which are formally codified rules) or quality criteria, such as 
codes of ethics. Resources, in turn, are the media through which agents exercise 
power. Giddens distinguishes between allocative resources, which refer to 
capabilities for generating command over material phenomena, objects, and 
goods, and authoritative resources, which generate command over people 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 33). The former include ownership, as well as financial and 
working conditions, and the latter include media authorities. Finally, as 
symbolized by the dashed line in the middle of Figure 1, a national mass media 
system and its context both develop along a historical path (Voltmer, 2013). This 
means, on the one hand, that all the social systems of a certain country are in 
constant change. On the other hand, without considering the past, there is no 
understanding of the present, because media outcomes “differ depending on the 
role the media have played” in previous regimes (Voltmer, 2013, p. 8). 
 
In the context of the present study, five points are important. First, although the 
categories presented in Figure 1 do not initially appear to differ substantially from 
those presented in the extant literature, the use of social theory allows for 
explanations of cause and effect and the generation of insights into the interaction 
between agency and structure. Second, the focus on media actors, their resources, 
and (written and unwritten) rules governing these actors is the key to 
understanding how the mass media works in a certain society. In this study, being 
in keeping with Lauk and Harro-Loit (2017, p. 1960), the term autonomy 
“presumes journalists’ independence from external pressures and complete loyalty 
to the public.” Leading to the third point, this means that the use of only two 
arrows in Figure 1 is a form of streamlining. Journalists’ independence can be 
limited not only by the structures that have been mentioned but also by the social 
and natural contexts; individual, collective, and corporative agents from any other 
social system; and foreign agents. Fourth, as is the case for most other models, 
Figure 1 both simplifies complex interactions and captures the present state of 
change. The term “path,” meaning the historical roots of structures, agents, and 
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interactions, cannot really fill this gap. Finally, the categories in Figure 1 function 
as a kind of divining rod that guides the search for research material. To illustrate 
this at the level of structures, for each country, I had to look for the constitution, 
media laws, and quality criteria (rules); for bodies of regulation and self-control, 
journalists’ unions, and key media; and for journalists’ working conditions (media 
ownership and financing, facilities, payment, and reputation) and journalism 
education. 
 
 
Research Design 
 
To obtain reliable information on all the categories mentioned in Figure 1, this 
paper draws on extensive documentary analysis to compare 46 national mass 
media systems that were selected according to the theoretical saturation method 
(Glaser and Strauss, 2008). The sampling procedure had two stages. In the first 
stage, which entailed deliberate selection, the member states of the G7 (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the USA) in addition to 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS) came in as must-haves. 
Even if one can argue about one case or another, these global powerhouses are role 
models, reference points, and even media format and media content distributors 
for many other countries. While the G7 countries are located primarily in the West, 
the BRICS countries comprise a number of important and growing nations that are 
on the brink of becoming global players (Nordenstreng and Thussu, 2015). The 
second step of the sampling procedure involved applying a different systems 
design (Anckar, 2008), varying the social context and the media and political 
structures (Figure 1), and aiming to achieve theoretical saturation; therefore, the 
selection criteria were as follows:  
 
 cultural zones based on the World Values Survey (African, South Asian, 
Protestant and Catholic European, Orthodox, Confucian, ex-Communist, 
English-speaking, and Latin American; e.g., Inglehart and Baker, 2000);  
 media freedom tradition and ranking (from rather high to very low); and  
 political structures (democracy, transition to democracy, semi-authoritarian, 
authoritarian, and fragile).  
 
Any concrete decision regarding a specific country is, therefore, contestable. For 
example, based on the criteria outlined above, every Scandinavian country would 
have been consistent with the very same characteristics (European democracy, 
top-ranked). The fact that Sweden, instead of Norway and Denmark, is finally a 
part of the sample is simply because there was easier access to experts there and, 
more importantly, because saturation was achieved. Other examples are Rwanda 
(to represent French-speaking Africa), Kuwait (to represent an Islamic monarchy), 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine (to represent former Soviet republics), and Hungary (to 
represent the transition to democracy). The selection procedure was ended 
whenever new cases did “not add any new information” to the understanding 
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(Auerbach and Silverstein, 2003, p. 102). Despite the inclusion of 46 nation-states, 
the missing countries remain a weakness of this study. Without in-depth research, 
there is no telling whether there would have been new insights from new cases. 
 
For each country, a report was written by a graduate student. Altogether, eight 
students took part in a master’s class that lasted a full year and included media 
systems, comparative research, structuration theory, and intensive training in 
qualitative research methods (source investigation, expert interviews, and 
evaluation procedures). The group was also involved in the development of the 
category system. As previously mentioned, the categories displayed in Figure 1 
guided the search for material. The first and most important sources were 
documents—constitutions and media laws; court decisions; reports from NGOs, 
such as Freedom House, IREX, and Reporters Without Borders; statements from 
authorities (e.g., ministries); and academic literature, including studies on 
journalists’ role perceptions, the media’s reputation, journalists’ working 
conditions, and journalism training.  
 
As the second source, we interviewed experts. The aim of these interviews was to 
facilitate interpretation of the legal texts, interest-based reports, or information 
given by those in government. Giddens’ approach in fact demands that agents are 
taken seriously. Therefore, the interviews provided insights into both structures 
(resources and informal rules) and the constellations of actors. To become an 
expert in this study, the interviewees had to deliver inside knowledge of the topics 
covered by one or more of the research categories (Figure 1). The people who were 
interviewed were leading local journalists with many years of professional 
experience, media authorities, unionists, media educators, NGO workers, foreign 
correspondents, and academics. In total, I collected more than 150 interviews (cf. 
Table 1). A look at the table in question shows, first, that the numbers of 
interviewees differed considerably from country to country and, second, that some 
country reports did not use any expert sources. The reasons for this are threefold. 
Apart from the increase in knowledge of the researchers as a result of the research 
process, which reduced the value of this source, for countries such as Israel, China, 
France, or Brazil, there was extensive academic and applied research literature 
available. In addition, while most of the experts answered via Skype, phone, or 
email, some interviews took place on site (Cuba, Egypt, Pakistan, Russia, Tanzania, 
and Uganda). Therefore, the number of interviewees is higher in these cases. The 
fieldwork started in 2014 and was completed in December 2017. 
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Table 1: Interviewed experts (n=185). No interviews: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chi-
na, France, Hungary, Israel, Kazakhstan, Sweden, Taiwan, Ukraine 
 
Country Expert sources 
Australia (4) 3 journalists, 1 foreign academic
Belarus (6) 4 journalists, 1 foreign correspondent, 1 university lecturer
Bolivia (6) 2 academics, 1 foreign correspondent, 1 media authority director, 1 diplomat, 1 
NGO 
Bulgaria (3) 1 academic, 1 managing editor, 1 journalist 
Cuba (5) 3 journalists, 1 foreign correspondent, 1 NGO activist
Egypt (12) 3 media researchers, 4 foreign correspondents, 4 journalists, 1 political scien-
tist 
Germany (2) 2 journalists 
Ghana (4) 1 media authority, 1 NGO, 1 local entrepreneur, 1 foreign news manager  
India (1) 1 academic 
Indonesia (2) 2 academics 
Iran (7) 1 foreign correspondent, 2 academics, 1 NGO activist, 3 citizens 
Iraq (11) 4 journalists, 1 media owner, 2 NGO, 1 academic, 3 foreign correspondents 
Italy (3) 1 journalist, 2 foreign correspondents
Japan (1) 1 foreign entrepreneur
Kuwait (4) 1 journalist, 1 academic, 2 government sources
Malta (6) 2 journalists, 1 unionist, 1 media owner, 2 academics
Mexico (7) 3 journalist, 1 foreign correspondent, 2 NGO activists, 1 academic 
Myanmar (5) 4 journalist, 1 foreign academic
Namibia (6) 2 journalists, 1 academic, 1 media authority member, 1 diplomat, 1 NGO  
Netherlands 
(4) 
2 academics, 2 media and public administration consultants
North Korea 
(2) 
1 documentary film maker, 1 NGO activist
Pakistan (15) 5 journalists, 5 NGO activists, 3 unionists, 1 politician, 1 correspondent 
Peru (2) 1 journalist, 1 citizen 
Russia (10) 6 journalists, 4 academics
Rwanda (1) 1 foreign correspondent
Singapore (5) 1 journalist, 1 foreign correspondent, 3 academics
South Africa 
(1) 
1 journalist 
Spain (1) 1 journalist 
Tanzania (8) 4 journalists, 2 media authority members, 1 media lawyer, 1 NGO activist 
Turkey (9) 3 journalists, 2 foreign correspondents, 4 academics
Uganda (21) 12 journalists, 3 unionists, 3 NGO, 1 academic, 1 presidential adviser, 1 media 
authority  
UK (2) 1 journalist, 1 academic
USA (2) 2 academics 
Venezuela (8) 2 journalists, 1 foreign journalist, 2 NGO, 2 academics, 1 citizen 
Vietnam (1) 1 foreign journalist 
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For both sources, validity, reliability, and representation are an issue. While some 
of the documents upon which this study is based are shaped by Western research 
traditions and may, therefore, have a certain focus on, for example, traditions of 
bribery, favors, and gifts, the expert interviews are even more questionable. First, 
there is simply no independent expert. Second, experts can contradict each other. 
Third, taking into account language and cultural barriers, not every expert talks to 
social scientists. The tool to address these problems is, once again, the category 
system (see Figure 1). Based on my knowledge of the shortcomings of every single 
source, for each category, I attempted to rely on a maximum amount of infor-
mation from various perspectives. This included confronting experts with conflict-
ing statements from other experts and from literature. Restated in other terms, the 
category-driven approach this study is based on does not require a certain number 
of interviews for every single country. The only thing that counts in the end is the 
amount of information and perspectives available in the various categories. 
 
To analyze the data from both sources (documents and experts), I followed a theo-
ry-driven approach, which differs from any classical grounded theory and herme-
neutics. The procedure can be best described as “theoretical coding,” that is, using 
the theoretical concept (cf. Figure 1) to interpret the research material (Creswell, 
2007, pp. 156–7). The initial finding was a portrait created for each country. These 
portraits then formed the basis for the mass media system typology. First, I needed 
to find dimensions that grasped the similarities and differences between types of 
countries. Then, I used the concept of attributed space (Lazarsfeld and Barton, 
1951) to gain an overview of all the potential combinations of the dimensions and 
started sorting the countries. With each new portrait, I decided whether the mass 
media system was similar to any of the others that had been sorted previously or 
whether it represented a completely new case in the attributed space. Using the ty-
pology as an analytical tool (i.e., identifying influencing factors) similar to cluster 
analysis, I looked for further characteristics shared by the different types (present-
ed in the conclusion section). Finally, I characterized the types, seeking to find ap-
propriate names for each type (cf. Figure 2). As for any typology, one could argue 
about the suitability of the wording. The six names proposed here are the result of 
discussions on the research material and are certainly open to criticism. 
 
Of course, similar to Blum (2014), Siebert et al. (1956), and Hallin and Mancini 
(2004), the typology’s first aim is to bring order to the abundance of national mass 
media systems. A type represents a group of states that share certain mass media 
characteristics. This definition leads directly to the main objection to using typolo-
gies at all. Based on the specifications of the dimensions, the researcher decides on 
the order that he or she gets as a result. Put differently, every typology contains an 
element of arbitrariness. However, the two dimensions used here fit the study’s 
basic assumptions and the research design. There is a second obvious counterar-
gument. Even after a very intense briefing, graduate students do not become full 
specialists for five or six different countries. In addition, a single researcher cannot 
be familiar with all the details of 46 media regulation regimes. This is why Hallin 
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and Mancini (2012), for example, asked leading researchers to write about their 
respective countries. This particular book, nevertheless, demonstrates the down-
side of this approach—that is, national lenses that range from a great deal of un-
derstanding concerning certain limitations of mass media freedom to open politi-
cal PR. Using a category system based on Giddens, the present study is committed 
to neutrality and transparency and waives any ranking or judgement.  
 
 
Results: Mass Media System Typology 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, all governments are interested in 
steering the public information and opinion-forming stages, as this enables them 
to maintain power. However, there are differences in how they implement their 
interest in legislation (rules) and mass media structures, such as ownership, fi-
nancing, training, or media-related authorities (resources). On the one hand, as 
the data show, some nation-states constitutionally define the media’s mission, 
while some do not. In the nation-states that are examined here, at the level of 
rules, there are various kinds of formal expectations toward the mass media, in-
cluding the promotion of ideology (communism), religion (e.g., Iran), national uni-
ty (e.g., Indonesia and Singapore), and harmony (e.g., Rwanda, where all terms 
related to the genocide are taboo). Regardless of the specific mission that journal-
ists have to fulfill, in these countries, the profession’s “loyalty to the public” is lim-
ited (Lauk and Harro-Loit, 2017, p. 1960). 
 
On the other hand, once again, based on the review of all the research material, 
even in countries in which such a mission is not defined in the constitution or in 
common law and practice, the nation-state has numerous opportunities to restrict 
media freedom by doing the following:  
 
 acting as media owner, advertiser, subscriber, and purchaser;  
 acting as a customer of infrastructure measures (via conglomeration);  
 acting as an accomplice of the military and security forces; and  
 defining taboos (such as threats to national security or pornography). 
 
In the typology that is presented here, these gateways to mass media used by the 
state are grouped from direct (state ownership or near-ownership of mass media 
or transmitters and license requirements) to indirect (state-sponsored journalism 
training, government PR, license fees, rules of advertising, and so on). In Figure 2, 
the x-axis detects state influences that extend beyond formal expectations. Con-
cisely, the more to the right, the more direct the state’s influence. Because the indi-
rect gateways to media content are also used in countries that are located to the 
right, less autonomy defined as “independence from external pressures” (Lauk and 
Harro-Loit, 2017, p. 1960) is more likely than in countries on the left-hand side of 
the figure.  
 
Vol.8No.1Spring/Summer 2018  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
12 
 
Even countries with a predefined constitutional or common law principle that de-
termines the functions that the mass media should fulfill differ in this way (at the 
levels of resources and agents, as Giddens would say). In Iran, Egypt, and Singa-
pore, for example, there are private media outlets. In addition, the citizens in these 
countries—theoretically and, in most parts, even practically—receive foreign me-
dia, even though there are licenses required and many other kinds of restrictions. 
Despite all the restrictions on the media, the countries assigned to the patriotism 
type are different from Cuba, China, Vietnam, and North Korea (idealism), where 
the ruling communist parties and their subordinates own all the media. According 
to a documentary filmmaker who travelled throughout North Korea professionally 
in 2014, the inhabitants of the country have no clue what the world beyond their 
national borders might look like. He stated that, “On TV, they just get homegrown 
military movies, political news praising the dynasty founded by Kim Il-Sung, do-
mestic sports, and soap operas.” 
 
To prevent any misinterpretation of this typology, the grouping of countries—such 
as Germany and Namibia or, to take another example, Spain, Ghana, and Paki-
stan—does just mean what the two typology criteria are all about. Neither Germa-
ny nor Namibia has a media mission in its constitution. Furthermore, the state’s 
gateways to media content are rather indirect in both countries—at least less direct 
than in cartelist or clientelist countries. Whether there are other features that are 
common to all liberal countries—for example, in terms of the journalism culture 
and mass media markets or traditions—is an open question. If such similarities ex-
ist, like in any other cluster analysis, those shared variables are considered factors 
that influence journalists’ autonomy. 
 
Before undertaking an in-depth examination of the six types of mass media sys-
tems presented in Figure 2, it is important to address two more points. First, in 
each type, there is considerable variance among the assigned countries. In addi-
tion, in some cases, such as Germany or Sweden, the names of the types are con-
trary to the labels that are evident in literature; however, they are still more suita-
ble than any other term when it comes to illustrating the common ground shared 
by all the countries that belong to one type. Second, both typology dimensions fit 
the two elements of Giddens’ term structure. The media mission is situated at the 
level of rules and the state’s influence at the level of resources.  
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Figure 2: Mass media system typology 
 
 
 
 
 
Idealism and Patriotism 
Beginning at the level of formal expectations (rules), even in the Soviet Union and 
the German Democratic Republic, which disappeared with the fall of the Berlin 
wall, the constitution granted press freedom. However, ideology defined what the 
media were all about back then (Fiedler, 2014). Today, it is still quite similar in 
China, North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam (communism), which belong to the ideal-
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ism type, as well as in the patriotism states, Iran (theocracy), Kuwait and Egypt 
(religion, too), Rwanda, Indonesia, and Singapore, which has five shared national 
values that were introduced by the government in 1991. With the aim of strength-
ening national identity, Singaporeans are encouraged to value the nation above the 
community and the society above the self. The other four “shared values” are “fam-
ily as the basic unit of society,” “community support and respect for the individu-
al,” “consensus not conflict,” and “racial and religious harmony” (Singapore, 1991). 
The expert interviews established that these requirements are not merely on paper; 
rather, according to Aaron Ng from the National University, “Singaporeans in gen-
eral do practice the shared values.” He also stated that “it is pretty much in the cul-
tural makeup of Singaporeans, especially the parts on religious and racial harmony 
and family as the basic unit of society.” Journalists are no exception. This is be-
cause, based on this background of shared values, the regime legitimizes rigid me-
dia laws. To quote Aaron Ng: “Local journalists are usually very careful about re-
porting on race and religion. Of course, one of the main reasons is that we have 
very tough laws on anyone who causes or can potentially cause racial unrest 
through words.” The five values have a major impact on journalists’ social position 
and their role perceptions. “Singapore’s journalists are circumspect about where 
the press stands in relation to the state and society. Most do not see their profes-
sion as the Fourth Estate or adversary of government” (George and Xiaoming, 
2012, p. 101).  
 
The patriotism type can be illustrated using a second case: In the constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the basic elements of Islam limit freedom of opinion 
in mass media. This approach is already clear from the constitution’s preamble, 
which states specifically that the media has to disseminate Islamic culture. Alt-
hough the country has ratified the UN social and civil pacts emphasizing that free-
dom of expression throughout the world is a universal right, the press law requires 
journalists, for example, to support politics and state and to fight luxury, immo-
rality, and lavishness. “Some subject matters, such as criticism of the Revolution-
ary Leader or insulting the Prophet Muhammad, are certainly taboo,” said Marcus 
Michaelsen, a scholar in political science, communication, and Islam. Similar to 
Singapore, a range of authorities monitors compliance with the guiding principles.  
 
However, the fact that religious, national, and communist ideologies steer mass 
media content does not mean that there are absolutely no guiding principles in all 
the countries listed in the upper part of Figure 2. If constitution and media law do 
not contain specific restrictions on the media nor specify the achievement of cer-
tain goals, the legal framework obviously follows the ideology of liberalism. 
 
Etatism  
The figure’s upper part depicts countries in which the press has no formal attach-
ment to any guiding principles; however, there are mass media systems in which 
the state and its associates are the primary contractors. Based on the sample, this 
is especially true for the following countries:  
Vol.8No.1Spring/Summer 2018  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
15 
 
 
 Belarus and Kazakhstan, where state and Russian media (mainly also state-
owned) have been dominating the landscape since the fall of the Soviet Un-
ion;  
 Russia itself;  
 Hungary, where the ruling Conservative party very recently changed owner-
ship structures in favor of the government, with wealthy supporters either 
taking over existing outlets or setting up new ones; pushed back foreign 
media companies; and shut down the leading oppositional newspaper;  
 Myanmar, with its dominant state-owned newspapers and broadcasters, as 
well as the government’s power in the licensing process and unfair financial 
setups for non-state-owned media; and 
 Malta, where the church and the two major parties that make up the state 
run most of the press and television companies.  
 
With just 400,000 inhabitants, the mini state Malta does not allow for commercial 
outlets. According to the interviewed experts, journalists in Malta are party offi-
cials rather than researchers and critics. “When hiring new staff, party affiliation is 
more important than journalistic skills,” said Malcolm Naudi from the Institute of 
Maltese Journalists. In Belarus, there are commercial media; however, similar to 
Myanmar, the state owns all the influential outlets. Jekaterina Tkatschenko, who 
works for a television station based in Warsaw, Poland, called the respective pro-
grams “propaganda,” stating that “they just justify the government’s decisions.” 
The major state-owned media profit from tax exemptions, and Belarus authorities 
have to subscribe to state-owned papers. In addition, the main press deliverer and 
television transmitters are state owned.  
 
Clientelism 
Moving a bit leftward in Figure 2, introducing commercial media does not auto-
matically mean decreasing state influence. Although there is a vivid media market 
in Venezuela, for example, the most important client advertiser is the Venezuelan 
state because the oil industry is 100 percent state owned. Uganda is another prime 
example of the clientelism type, where the states have numerous possibilities to 
influence media content (as the owner, the major advertiser, and the employer of 
the police and the courts). At first glance, regarding the matter of press freedom, 
President Museveni, who came to power in 1986, has been one of the Western 
world’s prize pupils for quite a long time. Under Museveni’s leadership, Uganda 
was quick to sign the 1991 Windhoek Declaration on Press Freedom. The country’s 
broadcast sector was liberalized as early as 1993. Today, besides the officially pub-
lic but state-controlled media, there are numerous privately owned radio stations, 
a commercial television, two English language dailies operating independently of 
the state (Daily Monitor and Red Pepper), and media regulation authorities, which 
arguably ensure that the media are held accountable for their actions. Consistent 
with these constellations of actors is the considerable appreciation for Western 
journalism concepts (cf. Mwesige, 2004).  
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However, there are many reports on interference in journalists’ autonomy (Meyen, 
Fiedler, and Schamberger, 2016). The expert interviews revealed that the presi-
dent’s influence is based on informal rules, which are rooted in the natural context 
(climate and topography). Ugandans’ awareness of the importance of media free-
dom is (still) rather weak. Put differently, the press is not at the top of the hierar-
chy of values; this position is occupied by jobs, security, and health. As Peter 
Mwesige, who heads the African Centre for Media Excellence, put it, a related 
problem “is the lack of media literacy.” He also stated that “many people don’t 
know if it is good or bad that a newspaper is shut down. They don’t see that brown 
envelopes are corruption, because they think they have to pay the journalists for 
their opinions being published.”  
 
Because the government and the governed, nevertheless, share a profound belief in 
media power, journalists are considered a risk rather than a chance. John Nagen-
da, a senior presidential adviser, called the Daily Monitor his “enemy” because it 
had four or five journalists “who never say something good about the government.” 
According to Nagenda, Museveni himself writes letters to the editor. On the day of 
the interview, the state-controlled daily New Vision, for example, printed a long 
Museveni piece about homosexuality without equivocation. It is not surprising, 
then, that many of the journalists who were interviewed regard the president as 
taboo. “He has said himself, ‘If you attack my family, then there is no compro-
mise,’” said a television news editor. In addition, the editor mentioned the military, 
the army, and national security, “because we have all these threats like Al-Shabbab 
or South Sudan.” Looking at the constellations of actors, the climate of opinion, 
which is conducive to interventions in media freedom, provides the government 
with the best conditions for limiting journalists’ autonomy and the unequal 
spreading of media ownership and resources. For the very same reason, advertis-
ing clients (including the government) can obviously exert influence on media en-
terprises. Although the dominant role perception of Ugandan journalists coincides 
with that of Western models (Mwesige, 2004, p. 69), local (formal and informal) 
rules, resources, and actor constellations prevent the mass media from investigat-
ing official claims and being ‘the voice of the voiceless.’ 
 
The assignment of Iraq and Pakistan (two vibrant markets with partisan media, 
difficult security situations, and bribery), as well as most sub-Saharan African 
(Ghana) and Latin American countries, such as Argentina or Bolivia (with their 
elite networks in politics, administration, military, police, and the media) to the 
clientelism type is not controversial. However, Spain’s inclusion in this group may 
be surprising. Following Hallin and Mancini (2004), political partisanship, high 
political parallelism, and influential parties are attributes of the Spanish mass me-
dia system. Because of both the lack of liberal structures and a slowly developing 
commercial market, the media is “dependent on the state, political parties, the 
church, or wealthy private patrons” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 103). Despite 
the economically triggered, sustained process of mass media concentration, there 
are still strong diverse actors who have their own interests, such as the Catalan 
Vol.8No.1Spring/Summer 2018  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
17 
 
press. Therefore, in the typology presented here, Spain is a clientelist country that 
has tendencies that are in keeping with cartelism. To a certain extent, Peru is a 
counterpart of Spain. Due to its high media concentration and its rather indirect 
political influence (via close ties to media moguls, licensing, and the personal in-
tervention of politicians), Peru was placed in the cartelism group. However, as in 
the clientelism group, Peruvian journalists are vulnerable to corruption and face 
arbitrary justice that is made possible by vaguely worded legislation. Therefore, as 
in other mass media system typologies, the boundaries between the types are fluid. 
 
Cartelism 
In cartelist mass media systems, the state is not involved as the principal owner, 
major advertiser, subscriber, or purchaser. This is mainly because of the economic 
power of the countries that belong to this type. In Turkey or Mexico, for example, 
there are numerous potential ad clients, which, on the surface, may not be part of 
the state’s sphere of influence. However, upon taking a closer look at the market 
structures, it becomes apparent that in both countries, two affiliated groups domi-
nate the media. Even more importantly, these companies engage in more than 
merely media activities. The Turkish trust Doğan, for example, is involved in road 
construction, petrol stations, and tourism. This is how the state as the major prin-
cipal of infrastructure measures came in despite media freedom on paper and de-
spite a private, commercial mass media market; this occurred long before Presi-
dent Erdogan started to ban opposition newspapers; jail independent journalists; 
and, in doing so, push his country toward the etatism or patriotism types. In Mexi-
co, where government ads are more important than in Turkey, people think of 
journalists as corrupt and view them as the servants of whoever pays them. “When 
journalists disappear or have been assassinated, there is no public outrage,” said 
Eileen Truax, who works as a freelancer and author. “People think these journalists 
deserve it.” According to cultural journalist Conceptión Morena, the perception of 
TV Azteca and Televisa as government mouthpieces persists to this day. 
 
In other cartelist countries, such as Brazil, Peru, Israel and Italy, the media market 
structures and the “combination of political power and media conglomerates” 
(Ragnedda, 2014, p. 14) are quite similar. In France, in addition to state subsidies, 
the strong involvement of investors from other branches, such as the aerospace or 
building industries, is a special feature of the media. Japan differs slightly due to 
its press club system, which involves close relationships between journalists and 
government or industry officials and which divides the media market into inside 
(participating) and outside (non-participating) media. The inside media outlets 
benefit from exclusive press club information, which, in exchange, leads to uncriti-
cal reporting against the authorities. Furthermore, many Japanese journalists re-
frain from critical reporting due to the principles of neutrality (fuhen futo) and 
harmony (Confucianism). As a result, the Japanese “media can be understood as 
collaborators with the state in the management of society” (Freeman, 2000, p. 
162). 
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Liberalism 
In liberal media systems (see the upper left part of Figure 2), state influence is 
even more indirect than in countries belonging to the clientelism and cartelism 
categories. As a rule, and despite the number of exceptions covered in this study 
too (e.g. Malta, Italy, France, Spain, Israel, or Hungary), the liberal type is located 
in the prosperous Western world, which appreciates liberal values, can look back at 
a long tradition of media freedom and of hosting strong commercial and public 
service media, and concentrates primarily on content production. A discussion 
about the literature on “manufacturing consent” in market-driven mass media sys-
tems promoting democracy as the system of rule (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) is 
beyond the scope of this paper; however, it should be clear how, under these cir-
cumstances, the elites infiltrate mass media content through think tanks, PR cam-
paigns, journalism training or background discussions, informal meetings, and 
networks (Krüger, 2015).  
 
However, unlike all the other mass media system types that were previously dis-
cussed, in the countries belonging to the liberal category, direct state intervention 
would be discussed and combated in public. Outside the Western hemisphere, lib-
eral mass media systems are likely to be extremely rare; in the present sample, 
these are Taiwan, India, South Africa, and Namibia. Taiwan is a special case, as it 
is seen as the freest media system in Asia with “one of the most competitive media 
markets in the world” (Wang, 2014, pp. 161-2). However, the indirect Chinese in-
fluence via strong investments in the media market should also be taken into ac-
count when discussing Taiwan’s media freedom. Regarding the latter three coun-
tries, both prosperous urban elites who expect to receive information from inde-
pendent sources, as well as the British role model, can explain this. “The media in 
Namibia play a very important role in terms of checks and balances and the watch-
dog role,” said Robin Tyson, lecturer in communication studies at the University of 
Namibia and former manager of the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). 
“We haven’t any intimidation. We do not have situations where journalists get ar-
rested. In addition, we are self-regulatory. We have a media ombudsman who is an 
independent person. People who have complaints can contact him.” 
Nevertheless, both Namibia’s media market structures and its political culture are 
different from those of other liberal countries. NBC’s major funding source is an 
annual state subsidy, and the company’s leadership is a council appointed by the 
information minister. The 1991 Namibian Broadcasting Act and the broadcaster’s 
mandate have to date prevented the abuse of these structures of constellations; 
however, first, NBC is the major source of information, particularly for individuals 
in rural and peripheral areas. Second, the very same party has easily won all elec-
tions since independence. “There is some backlash,” said Robin Tyson in Decem-
ber 2014. “The ruling party, SWAPO, has mentioned, that they want to ban Face-
book, which is going to be virtually impossible. But you can see that they are wor-
ried about the influence that Facebook has. They are worried maybe about the free 
open conversation that people have on Facebook.” In this respect, it is important to 
remember that media freedom is even contested in liberal countries.  
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Conclusion: What or Who Decides on Journalists’ Autonomy? 
 
First, the mass media system typology presented in Figure 2 differs from press 
freedom rankings by NGOs, such as Freedom House. In other words, there is no 
judgement; rather, there are differences in how governments and states steer and 
control public communication channels to serve their own interests. Apart from 
organizing the multitude of national mass media systems, the most important aim 
of the typology is to address the question of influencing factors. What are the 
threats to and conditions of journalists’ autonomy? Or, using the terminology of 
qualitative research methodology and extending beyond the two dimensions 
grounded in Giddens’ terminology (i.e., typology is based on rules [media mission] 
and resources [state influence or near-influence]), what are the further variables 
shared by countries that belong to a certain type? Using the typology as presented 
above as an analytical tool similar to cluster analysis, I looked for further charac-
teristics shared by the different types. To ensure traceability and to avoid repeti-
tions, in each case I refer to the mass media system type(s) the respective influenc-
ing factors are based on.  
 
Most obviously, at the level of codified rules, media freedom requires the waiving 
of a guiding principle in the constitution or in media law.  
 
 First, in the patriotism and idealism categories, state ideology strongly re-
stricts journalists’ autonomy.  
 Second, laws ensuring media freedom exist only on paper until the state can 
exercise its monopoly on power and the rule of law (social and political con-
text). In some countries belonging to the cartelism and clientelism types 
(e.g., Mexico, Pakistan, Iraq, and Uganda), this is not the case, or if it is, 
there are major reservations. In Pakistan, for example, the military and se-
cret service define taboos, block reporting on whole regions, and even kill 
defiant journalists, but they never receive any punishment.  
 Third, in both media system types, at the level of allocative resources, media 
financing, and closely related to financing, market structures and low wages 
are the main gateways for state influence on media content. This is also true 
for countries of the etatism type, where the state or major political actors 
even own the most important outlets.  
 Fourth, the example of Pakistan illustrates that weak national identities, 
wars, and disputed borders facilitate restrictions on journalists’ autonomy 
(social and political context). Again, a discussion of the current political sit-
uation and the state of nation building in Turkey, Russia, Belarus, Malta, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Israel, or Singapore is beyond the scope of this study; 
however, it is obvious that ruling and fighting powers legitimize taboos, edi-
torial sanctions and interventions, and even attacks on journalists in the 
name of national security and national interests.  
 Fifth, knowing that the police or the secret service are able to harass them 
with impunity, journalists are very careful, especially if there is no aware-
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ness of the importance of journalism in the specific country (social context 
and informal rules). At the level of authoritative resources, primarily in cli-
entelism and cartelism mass media systems, the lack of public pressure 
against violations of journalists’ autonomy strengthens the ruling powers. 
 
At this point, it seems important to highlight the link between society’s expecta-
tions, rules (media laws), allocative resources (media ownership), authoritative re-
sources (media regulation authorities), as well as the influential possibilities of pol-
itics and the economy. In Uganda, for example, many of the journalists and media 
activists who were interviewed complained about the ownership structures. The 
vast majority of commercial and state-independent outlets belong to politicians 
who are closely tied to the ruling party (the NRM) or religious leadership. Some 
journalists are even on the payrolls of politicians. In this African country, a second 
type of ownership is solely commercially oriented. “Those people are not interested 
in informing the people,” said a rural radio journalist. “For them, it’s just a busi-
ness opportunity. That’s why the ad industry is affecting us.” The consequences of 
commercially oriented ownership are self-censorship, a dependent media land-
scape, and authorities that feel encouraged to extend their competencies (Meyen, 
Fiedler, and Schamberger, 2016).  
 
Again, as seen through Giddens’ lens, the main reasons for the lack of journalists’ 
autonomy and media freedom are informal rules and the social context. More con-
cretely, in countries outside the liberal, patriotism, and idealism types, journalists’ 
working conditions and, related to this and even more importantly, the percep-
tions that the ruling elites, the public administrations, and the governed have of 
journalists limit media freedom and journalists’ autonomy. Particularly in clien-
telist and cartelist mass media systems, it is precisely the media’s relative societal 
position and related resources that allow ruling elites to implement systems of me-
dia laws and media regulation authorities that create arbitrariness and, therefore, 
a feeling of insecurity within the profession. In addition, the people who are in 
power also know about Western expectations of journalism and mass media. They 
may pay lip service to the principles of freedom and even sign respective laws and 
international declarations; however, without public pressure, deriving from the 
tradition of press freedom, personal experience, and media literacy, journalists 
who criticize those in power will continue to face serious threats. This applies not 
only to opposition journalists in countries assigned to the patriotism and idealism 
types but also to their colleagues who work in countries with no constitutional 
principles that determine the functions that are beyond the critique and control of 
those in power.  
 
Comparing liberal mass media systems with the five other types—besides a socially 
shared conviction that journalists’ autonomy is important, as well as international 
observation and journalistic professionalization—the conditions of media freedom 
are a healthy advertising market and a low media concentration that excludes oth-
er businesses. Looking at both decreasing ad revenues and competition from social 
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media, media policymakers face a twofold task. On the one hand, they have to de-
fend the ideals of media freedom and journalists’ autonomy and, in this way, 
strengthen the media’s societal position all over the world. On the other hand, as 
an examination of the cartelist and clientelist countries reveals, autonomous jour-
nalists need to be financed without any interest other than the public good. 
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